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DEK, KEK and Master key - Information Security Stack Exchange DEK - Data Encryption Key The key used to encrypt the data e g Key: 1234 with AES 128 as encryption algorithem - 1234 is the DEK KEK - Key Encryption Key e g Encrypt (from DEK above) 1234 with 9999; 9999 is the KEK Master Key or MEK - Master Encryption Key This key is used to encrypt decrypt DEK and KEK in transit; usually used for KEK
encryption - Why not use the KEK directly to encrypt data . . . To use it, you authenticate to it, pass in an encrypted DEK, and it returns the unencrypted DEK (A YubiKey is an example of a small personal HSM that protects your passwords instead of DEKs So-called "enterprise grade" HSMs are usually expensive rack mounted devices that are locked in special cages inside corporate data centers )
encryption - How do SED drives generate the DEK? - Information Security . . . The DEK is used to encrypt all content on the drive In the case the drive needs to be securely wiped, the DEK can simply be erased, regardless of whether or not the AK is set According to the TCG , the DEK is generated on the drive itself, rather than being generated on the computer and transferred over through some vendor-specific ATA command:
Hierarchical Key Rotation. Should I rotate the lowest level keys? Ultimately, your DEK is the critical one - if someone has your data and your DEK then it is game over Moreover, if someone has access to your data and the DEK then rotating all the other keys won't matter Still, only you can decide whether or not it is worth the effort to rotate the DEK Hence the question: what is your threat model?
cryptography - Exchange of DEK and KEK (encryption keys) between app . . . The key to encrypt the DEK is stored in a totally separate server and is called the Key Encryption Key (KEK) So everytime a data is to be encrypted decrypted, first the KEK is used to decrypt the en_dek, which gives me the actual DEK, and then this DEK is used to encrypt decrypt the user's data Now my question is:
encryption - How to decrypt the Encrypted DEK using KEK which are . . . You can just toss the key server, as anyone with access to the app server, one time, can get the DEK and you're done You're better of using asymmetric crypto (the KEK) and generating a session key (DEK) for each item That way, the app server can encrypt with the public key of the KEK and a new DEK for each item
Can AWS KMS be used for both KEK and DEK for PCI DSS? There's nothing within the PCI DSS which would prevent you from using AWS KMS for both the KEK and the DEK You should ensure you're generating strong keys, the KEK is equivalent strength to the DEK (e g both AES 256-bit), the DEK is encrypted by the KEK and you have separate key custodians for key components
Is it Secure to Use a Single AES-GCM Encryption Key for an Entire . . . Note that rotating the KEK will not stop you from hitting invocation limits for the DEK If those (or the DEK being compromised somehow) are a potential concern, you might want to support incremental DEK rotation e g by allowing multiple DEKs per database and tagging each row (or field or whatever chunk of data makes the most sense) with an (unencrypted!) number indicating which DEK it is
key management - Information Security Stack Exchange I will be storing the AES key (DEK) in a HSM-based key management service (ie Azure Key Vault AWS KMS) and will retrieve the key to encrypt decrypt data on my Nodejs server I have scoured the internets for best practices, however, details and explanations only seem to go so far as to whether keys should be stored in the database,hard-coded
How to process or manage Key-Encryption-Key using HSM? 1 Data-Encryption-Key(DEK) 2 Key-Encryption-Key(KEK) KEK will be securely stored in HSM, which will be encrypted using master key Data Encryption Key will be decrypted using KEK Based on the above concept, my doubts are: Do we need to send the Encrypted DEK to the HSM for decrypting it or Do we need to decrypt the KEK and retrieve it from HSM ?