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- DEK, KEK and Master key - Information Security Stack Exchange
This article is intended to be a simplified explanation sans drill-down for people wanting to understand these concepts terms What are DEK, KEK and MEK Master key?
- encryption - Why not use the KEK directly to encrypt data . . .
The DEK never changes: you don't want to re-encrypt every single file, so you don't change the DEK You may want to change the KEK: if your KEK expires, got compromised, or you transfer ownership of the data to someone, you can re-encrypt the DEK with another key
- cryptography - Exchange of DEK and KEK (encryption keys) between app . . .
To make the system more secure, instead of storing DEK in plain text in the app server, it is stored in encrypted form (en_dek) in the app server The key to encrypt the DEK is stored in a totally separate server and is called the Key Encryption Key (KEK)
- How do SED drives generate the DEK? - Information Security Stack Exchange
The DEK is used to encrypt all content on the drive In the case the drive needs to be securely wiped, the DEK can simply be erased, regardless of whether or not the AK is set According to the TCG, the DEK is generated on the drive itself, rather than being generated on the computer and transferred over through some vendor-specific ATA command:
- Hierarchical Key Rotation. Should I rotate the lowest level keys?
Ultimately, your DEK is the critical one - if someone has your data and your DEK then it is game over Moreover, if someone has access to your data and the DEK then rotating all the other keys won't matter Still, only you can decide whether or not it is worth the effort to rotate the DEK Hence the question: what is your threat model?
- Why is there a des-ede3-cbc in my rsa private key?
Why is there des-ede3-cbs in my rsa private key? Because your private key is encrypted with that As far as I know "DES" is an encryption standard from the seventies and it's considered broken Yup Pretty much Consider reencrypting it with AES like so: $ openssl rsa -in desencryptedprivkey pem -out aesencryptedprivkey pem -aes128 EDIT 2015-06-29: Good enough after all Reading Bruno's answer
- Is it Secure to Use a Single AES-GCM Encryption Key for an Entire . . .
A better option is to have two keys: A data encryption key (DEK) which encrypts the data and a key encryption key (KEK) which encrypts the DEK When you rotate the KEK, you only have to re-encrypt the DEK, not all data For rotating the DEK, assign a unique ID to each key and store this ID together with the ciphertext
- encryption - How to decrypt the Encrypted DEK using KEK which are . . .
Decrypting the DEK using KEK under PCI-Standards, which are separated by Servers: Let say for example we have server1 and server2 Server1: It is in East US, called it as Application Server Host
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